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Abstract
Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete
in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. The
resulting equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints is complicated by nonconvex agent problems and
therefore providing tractable conditions for existence of global or even local equilibria for it has proved chal-
lenging. Consequently, much of the extant research on this topic is either model specific or relies on weaker
notions of equilibria. We consider a modified formulation in which every leader is cognizant of the equilibrium
constraints of all leaders. Equilibria of this modified game contain the equilibria, if any, of the original game.
The new formulation has a constraint structure called shared constraints, and our main result shows that if the
leader objectives admit a potential function, the global minimizers of the potential function over the shared
constraint are equilibria of the modified formulation. We provide another existence result using fixed point the-
ory that does not require potentiality. Additionally, local minima, B-stationary, and strong-stationary points
of this minimization are shown to be local Nash equilibria, Nash B-stationary, and Nash strong-stationary
points of the corresponding multi-leader multi-follower game. We demonstrate the relationship between varia-
tional equilibria associated with this modified shared-constraint game and equilibria of the original game from
the standpoint of the multiplier sets and show how equilibria of the original formulation may be recovered.
We note through several examples that such potential multi-leader multi-follower games capture a breadth of
application problems of interest and demonstrate our findings on a multi-leader multi-follower Cournot game.
1 Introduction
This paper concerns multi-leader multi-follower games where multiple Stackelberg leaders participate in a simul-
taneous move game, multiple followers particpate in a subsequent simultaneous move game taking the strategies
of the leaders as given and leaders make decisions subject to the equilibrium conditions arising from the game
between followers. This follower-level equilibrium need not be unique as a function of the leader strategy profile
and leaders and followers may have a continuum of strategies, whereby an equilibrium of the game between lead-
ers is characterized by an analytically difficult problem. This problem is popularly referred to as an equilibrium
program with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). We are concerned with the central question of the existence of
an equilibrium to this problem.
Games described above arise organically in the modeling of a sequence of clearings such as the day-ahead
and real-time clearings in power markets. Increases in the computing capability have enabled “rational” firms to
make decisions with longer time horizons and by taking into account explicitly the situation that would emerge
in later clearings. Consequently, models of these strategic interactions require a firm to be not just strategic with
respect to other firms but also cognizant of the real-time market clearing to follow [38, 37, 32]. Technically such
firms must be modeled as leaders that participate in a Nash game subject to the equilibrium amongst another
set of participants called followers. The resulting game is a multi-leader multi-follower game.
While such models are indeed reasonable representations of the hierarchical competitive structure, general
results on existence of equilibria are scarce. Definitive statements on the existence of equilibria have been obtained
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mainly for multi-leader multi-follower games with specific structure [33, 34, 37] and for models arising from specific
applications [4, 24]. Furthermore, these results are reliant on the follower-level problem having a clean structure,
in most cases uniqueness of its equilibrium as a function of the leader strategies, so that upon substituting this
equilibrium into the leader’s objectives the resulting implicit problem has a form amenable to analysis via standard
fixed-point theorems1. To the contrary, the main results of this paper impose no such requirements and probe
EPECs from an entirely new perspective. Our contributions are as follows.
(i) We present a modified formulation of multi-leader multi-follower competition in which there exists a com-
mon (or shared) constraint that constrains each player’s optimization problem [29, 7, 18]. The conventional
formulation (which has been analyzed by the above surveyed results) of a multi-leader multi-follower game
bears a close resemblance to shared-constraint game, but it is technically not a shared-constraint game,
thereby motivating the need for a modified formulation. We show that if the leader objectives admit a
potential function, then any minimizer of the potential function over a shared constraint is an equilibrium
of the modified game. Furthermore, equilibria of the conventional formulation are equilibria of the modi-
fied formulation. Additionally, we show that local minimizers, B-stationary points, and strong-stationary
points of this potential function over the shared constraint are local Nash equilibria, Nash B-stationary
points, and Nash strong-stationary points of the modified game. We further show how the structure of
shared constraints can be exploited in games that do not admit potential functions via advanced fixed-point
theorems.
(ii) We present a clear understanding of the relationship between equilibria associated with the two formulations.
First, it can be seen that modified game is a shared-constraint game that admits at least two sets of
generalized Nash equilibria of interest: (i) Equilibria of the original game; and (ii) Equilibria characterized
by a “common” or consistent Lagrange multiplier that can be viewed as variational equilibria [18] for which
existence statements are available.
At a high level, this paper is motivated by the view that the competition between multiple Stackelberg leaders is
not an obscure or pathological setting and may thereby admit a mathematical model that allows for a reasonably
general existence theory. The shared-constraint model is an attempt in this direction. Our modified model can
be viewed as either an alternative model or it can be seen as a vehicle for developing existence statements for the
conventional model.
The remainder of the paper is organized into five sections. In Section 2, we introduce the conventional
formulation and survey multi-leader multi-follower games studied in practice provide some background. In Section
3 we present the modification that leads to a shared-constraint game and present existence results for it. Recovery
of equilibria of the original formulation is examined in Section 4. We apply our techniques towards the analysis
of a hierarchical Cournot game in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6 with a brief summary.
2 Multi-leader multi-follower games: examples and background
This section begins with a general formulation for such games and the associated equilibrium problem in Sec-
tion 2.1. In Section 2.2, we discuss several examples considered in literature with the intent of noting that in a
majority of these instances, the associated objective functions of the leaders admit a potential function, thereby
also noting the utility of this class in practice. Section 2.3 contains a few preliminaries for the results to follow.
2.1 Conventional formulation of multi-leader multi-follower games
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , N} denote the set of leaders. In the conventional formulation of multi-leader multi-follower
games, leader i ∈ N solves a parametrized optimization problem of the following kind
Li(x
−i, y−i) minimize
xi,yi
ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i)
subject to
xi ∈ Xi,
yi ∈ Yi,
yi ∈ SOL(G(xi, x−i, ·),K(xi, x−i)),
1A few other lines of work have shown the solvability of stationarity conditions of the problems of the leaders [16, 32, 26, 27, 21, 36].
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where,
x−i , (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ) and (x¯i, x
−i) , (x1, . . . , xi−1, x¯i, xi+1, . . . , xN ).
In this formulation, the leader makes two decisions: his strategy denoted xi ∈ R
mi , and his conjecture about
the equilibrium of the followers, denoted yi. The choice of the optimal strategy xi can vary with the precise
follower equilibrium that occurs; if this equilibrium is not unique, the leader must make a conjecture about which
of the several follower equilibria will actually emerge. Since this conjecture yi influences the choice of xi, yi is
also a decision. The formulation above corresponds to an optimistic one since the leader picks the yi that is
most favorable to him [22]. The pessimistic formulation (more standard amongst control theorists [3]) involves a
‘minxi maxyi ’.
The set of equilibria of the game between followers are given as SOL(G(xi, x
−i, ·),K(xi, x−i)), which stands for
the solution set of the variational inequality (VI), VI(G(x, ·),K(x)), parametrized by the tuple of leader strategies
x = (x1, . . . , xN ). For each x, we let
S(x) , SOL(G(xi, x
−i, ·),K(xi, x
−i)). (1)
Throughout we assume that K is continuous as a set-valued map and G is a continuous mapping of all variables.
The sets Xi and Yi are assumed to be closed convex sets. For each i, objective function ϕi : X × Y → R,
where X ,
∏N
i=1Xi and Y ,
∏N
i=1 Yi, is assumed to be continuous. Let y = (y1, . . . , yN) and Ωi(x
−i, y−i) be
the feasible region of Li(x
−i, y−i), given by
Ωi(x
−i, y−i) ,
(xi, yi) ∈ Rni
∣∣∣∣∣∣
xi ∈ Xi,
yi ∈ Yi,
yi ∈ S(x)
 , (2)
where Rn is the ambient space of the tuple (xi, yi). Notice that, Ωi(x
−i, y−i) is in fact independent of y−i.
However we use this notation to maintain consistency with other notation we introduce in the context of shared
constraints. Let Ω(x, y) denote the Cartesian product of Ωi(x
−i, y−i) :
Ω(x, y) ,
N∏
i=1
Ωi(x
−i, y−i). (3)
An important object in our analysis is the set F defined as
F ,
(x, y) ∈ Rn
∣∣∣∣∣∣
xi ∈ Xi,
yi ∈ Yi,
yi ∈ S(x), i = 1, . . . , N
 . (4)
Clearly, F = {(x, y) ∈ Rn : (x, y) ∈ Ω(x, y)}. We refer to Ω as the feasible region mapping and denote this
multi-leader multi-follower game or EPEC by E .
Definition 2.1 (Global Nash equilibrium) Consider the multi-leader multi-follower game E . The global
Nash equilibrium, or equilibrium, of E is a point (x, y) ∈ F that satisfies the following:
ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i) ≤ ϕi(ui, vi;x
−i) ∀(ui, vi) ∈ Ωi(x
−i, y−i), i = 1, . . . , N. (5)
Local notions of equilibria will be defined later in the paper.
2.2 Examples of multi-leader multi-follower games
The multi-leader multi-follower game is inspired by a strategic game in economic theory referred to as a Stackelberg
game [35]. In such a game, the leader is aware of the strategic consequences of the follower’s reaction and employs
that knowledge in making a first move. The follower observes this move and responds as per its optimization
problem. An extension to this regime was provided by Sherali et al. [34] where a set of followers compete in a
Cournot game while a leader makes a decision constrained by the equilibrium of this game. While multi-leader
generalizations were touched upon by Okuguchi [25], Sherali [33] presented amongst the first models for multi-
leader multi-follower games in a Cournot regime. A majority of multi-leader multi-follower game-theoretic models
appear to fall into three broad categories. We provide a short description of the games arising in each category:
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Hierarchical Cournot games: In a hierarchical Cournot game, leaders compete in a Cournot game and are
constrained by the reactions of a set of followers that also compete in a Cournot game. We discuss a setting
comprising of N leaders and M followers, akin to that proposed by Sherali [33]. Suppose the ith leader’s decision
is denoted by xi and the follower strategies conjectured by leader i are collectively denoted by {y
f
i }
M
f=1 where f
denotes the follower index. Given the leaders’ decisions, follower f participates in a Cournot game in which it
solves the following parametrized problem:
F(y¯−f , x) minimize
yf
1
2cf (y
f )2 − yfp (y¯ + x¯))
subject to yf ≥ 0,
where p(.) denotes the price function associated with the follower Cournot game, 12cf (y
f )2 denotes firm f ’s
quadratic cost of production, x¯ ,
∑
i xi, y¯ ,
∑
f y
f , and y¯−f ,
∑
j 6=f y
j . Leader i solves the following
parametrized problem:
Li(x
−i, y−i) minimize
xi,yi
1
2dix
2
i − xip (x¯+ y¯i))
subject to
yfi = SOL(F(y¯
−f
i , xi, x
−i)), ∀ f,
xi ≥ 0,
where yfi ∈ R is leader i’s conjecture of follower f ’s equilibrium strategy, yi , {y
f
i }
M
f=1,
1
2dix
2
i denotes the cost
of production of leader i, x−i , {xj}j 6=i and y−i , {y
f
j }
M
j 6=i,f=1. The equilibrium of the resulting multi-leader
multi-follower is given by {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 where (xi, yi) is a solution of Li(x
−i, y−i) for i = 1, . . . , N . In this regime,
under identical leader costs, Sherali [33] proved the existence and uniqueness of the associated equilibrium. More
recently, DeMiguel and Xu [4] extended this result to stochastic regimes wherein the price function is uncertain
and the leaders solve expected-value problems.
Spot-forward markets: Motivated by the need to investigate the role of forward transactions in power markets,
there has been much interest in strategic models where firms compete in the forward market subject to equilibrium
in the real-time market. Allaz and Vila [1] examined a forward market comprising of two identical Cournot firms
and demonstrated that global equilibria exist in such markets. Su [37] extended these existence statements to
a multi-player regime where firms need not have identical costs. In such an N -player setting, given the forward
decisions of the players {xi}Ni=1, firm i solves the following parametrized problem in spot-market:
S(z−i, x) minimize
zi
cizi − p (z¯) (zi − xi)
subject to zi ≥ 0,
yi,j is the where cizi is the linear cost of producing zi units in the spot-market, z¯ =
∑
j zj and p(.) is the price
function in the spot-market. In the forward market, firm i’s objective is given by its overall profit, which is
given by −pfxi − p(y¯i)(yi,i − xi) + ciyi,i, where pf denotes the price in the forward market yi,j is the anticipated
equilibrium production by leader j and y¯i =
∑
j yi,j . By imposing the no-arbitrage constraint that requires that
pf = p(y¯i), the forward market objective reduces to ciyi,i − p(y¯i)yi,i. Firm i’s problem in the forward market is
given by the following:
L(x−i) minimize
xi,yi
ciyi,i − p(y¯i)yi,i
subject to yi,j ∈ SOL(S(y¯
−j
i , xi, x
−i)), ∀ j.
Note that while the spot-forward market problem is closely related to the hierarchical Cournot game, it has two
key distinctions. First, leader i’s cost is a function of forward and spot decisions. Second, every leader’s revenue
includes the revenue from the second-level spot-market sales. As a consequence, the problem cannot be reduced
to the hierarchical Cournot game, as observed by Su [37]. In related work, Shanbhag, Infanger and Glynn [32]
conclude the existence of local equilibria in a regime where each firm employs a conjecture of the forward price
function. Finally, in a constrained variant of the spot-forward game examined by Allaz and Vila, Murphy and
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Smeers [24] prove the existence of global equilibria when firm capacities are endogenously determined by trading
on a capacity market and further discover that Allaz and Vila’s conclusions regarding the benefits of forward
markets may not necessarily hold. In electricity markets, there has been work beyond the papers mentioned
above, in particular, by Henrion, Outrata, and Surowiec [14] and Escobar and Jofre´ [6].
We conclude this section with two observations. First, almost all of the existence results are model-specific and
are not more generally applicable to the class of multi-leader multi-follower games. Second, in all of the instances
surveyed above, the leader objectives admit a potential function. For instance, in hierarchical Cournot games,
if the associated price functions are affine, then the resulting game is a potential multi-leader multi-follower
game (cf. [23]). In the spot-forward games, the leader’s objectives are dependent only on follower decisions;
consequently, the payoffs are independent of competitive decisions and this can be immediately seen to be a
potential multi-leader multi-follower game.
2.3 Preliminaries
This paper makes extensive use of shared constraints and potential functions. In this section we review these
concepts.
2.3.1 Background on shared-constraint games
Shared-constraint games were introduced by Rosen [29] as a generalization of the classical Nash game. In a
shared-constraint game, there exists a set C in the product space of strategies such that for any player i, and for
any tuple of strategies of other players (denoted z−i), the feasible strategies zi for player i are those that satisfy
(zi, z
−i) ∈ C. In an N -person shared-constraint Nash game with player payoffs denoted by {f1, . . . , fN}, player i
solves:
Ai(z
−i) minimize
zi
fi(zi; z
−i)
subject to (zi, z
−i) ∈ C
An equilibrium z = (z1, . . . , zN) satisfies the following:
z ∈ C, fi(z1, . . . , zN ) ≤ fi(z1, . . . , z¯i, . . . , zN ) ∀ z¯i s.t. (z1, . . . , z¯i, . . . , zN ) ∈ C, ∀ i ∈ N . (6)
Equivalently, z is an equilibrium if z ∈ ΩC(z) and for all i
fi(z1, . . . , zN) ≤ fi(z1, . . . , z¯i, . . . , zN ) ∀ z¯i ∈ Ω
C
i (z
−i),
where
ΩC(z) ,
N∏
i=1
ΩCi (z
−i) and ΩCi (z
−i) ,
{
z¯i | (z¯i; z
−i) ∈ C
}
.
It is easy to show [18] that z ∈ C ⇐⇒ z ∈ ΩC(z)
The feasible region mapping Ω defined in (3) (where Ωi(x
−i, y−i) is the feasible region of Li(x
−i, y−i)) is a
shared constraint if Ω has the following structure: for (x, y) in the domain of Ω,
(u, v) ∈ Ω(x, y) ⇐⇒ (ui, x
−i, vi, y
−i) ∈ F ∀ i ∈ N . (7)
(Recall that F was defined in (4) and is the set of fixed points of Ω). It is easy to check that this condition does
not hold in general for the mapping Ω, whereby E is in general not a shared constraint game.
Instead E is a coupled constraint game or abstract economy [2] where constraints of a player are dependent
on the choices of other players, but it does not obey the form of (7). In such a game, an equilibrium is a point z
such that
z ∈
N∏
i=1
ΩNSi (z
−i), fi(z1, . . . , zN ) ≤ fi(z1, . . . , z¯i, . . . , zN ) ∀ z¯i ∈ Ω
NS
i (z
−i), ∀ i ∈ N .
Here ΩNSi is any set-valued map, not necessarily of the form of a shared constraint. The key difference between
ΩNS and ΩC is that ΩC is completely defined by its fixed point set (C), whereas ΩNS is not. However in both
5
cases, the equilibrium is a point that lies in the fixed point set (given by ∩Ni=1Ci for Ω
NS, where Ci is the graph
of ΩNSi ). The shared-constraint game is a special case of this with Ci = Cj = C = ∩kCk for all i, j, k.
Shared constraint games arise naturally when players face a common constraint, e.g. in a bandwidth sharing
game, and are an area of flourishing recent research; see [8, 18]. Less is known in literature about coupled
constraint games without shared constraint even with convex constraints. On the contrary, much has been said
about shared constraint games when the common constraint C is convex (see particularly, the works of Rosen
[29], Facchinei et al. [7], Kulkarni and Shanbhag [18, 19, 17] and Facchinei and Pang [10]).
2.3.2 Potential games
Potential games were introduced by Monderer and Shapley [23]. In the context of E , we say
Definition 2.2 (Potential game) A multi-leader multi-follower game E where leaders have objective functions
ϕi, i ∈ N is a potential game if there exists a function pi, called potential function, such that for all i ∈ N , for all
(xi, x
−i) ∈ X, (yi, y−i) ∈ Y and for all x′i ∈ Xi, y
′
i ∈ Yi
ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i, y−i)− ϕi(x
′
i, y
′
i;x
−i, y−i) = pi(xi, yi;x
−i, y−i)− pi(x′i, y
′
i;x
−i, y−i). (8)
If ϕi is a continuously differentiable function for i = 1, . . . , N , then it follows [23] that pi is continuously differen-
tiable. In this case pi is a potential function if and only if
∇iϕi(xi, yi;x
−i, y−i) = ∇ipi(xi, yi;x
−i, y−i) ∀ x, y, ∀ i, (9)
where ∇i =
∂
∂(xi,yi)
. i.e., if and only if the mapping
F , (∇1ϕ1, . . . ,∇NϕN ) (10)
is integrable. The following lemma follows from a well known characterization of integrable mappings.
Proposition 2.1 Consider a multi-leader multi-follower game in which the objective functions ϕi, i ∈ N of the
leaders are continuously differentiable. Then the game is a potential game if and only if for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y ,
the Jacobian ∇F (x, y) is a symmetric matrix.
3 Existence statements for the shared-constraint formulation
In this section, we present a shared constraint modification of the conventional formulation and existence results
for it. We begin with an illustrative example in Section 3.1 and provide a general formulation in Section 3.2.
Sufficiency conditions for the existence of global and Nash-stationary equilibria are derived in Sections 3.3 and
3.4, respectively. The section concludes with Section 3.5 which provides an analysis of existence of global equilibria
via fixed-point theory.
3.1 Motivation: The Pang and Fukushima example [28]
To motivate the modified model we recall the example Pang and Fukushima [28] presented to make the point
that even simple multi-leader multi-follower games may not admit equilibria in pure strategies. We then analyze
a modified version of this example that captures the spirit of the modified formulation we present.
Example 3.1. A modified version of the Pang and Fukushima example [28]: Pang and Fukushima
consider a multi-leader multi-follower game comprising of two leaders and one follower [28]. The follower is solves
the optimization problem
min
y≥0
{
y(−1 + x1 + x2) +
1
2y
2
}
= max {0, 1− x1 − x2}
Leaders solve the following optimization problems.
L1(x2) minimize
x1,y1
ϕ1(x1, y1) =
1
2x1 + y1
subject to
x1 ∈ [0, 1]
y1 = max{0, 1− x1 − x2}
L2(x1) minimize
x2,y2
ϕ2(x2, y2) = −
1
2x2 − y2
subject to
x2 ∈ [0, 1]
y2 = max{0, 1− x1 − x2}
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where X1 = X2 = [0, 1] and Y = R. By substituting for y1 (respectively, y2), we find that L1(x2) is a convex
problem for any x2 but L2(x1) is not a convex problem in the space of x2. Specifically, L2(x1) can be rewritten
as
L2(x1) minimize
x2
min
(
− 12x2,−1 + x1 −
1
2x2
)
subject to x2 ∈ [0, 1].
The reaction maps R1 : X2 → X1,R2 : X1 → X2 that capture the best response for players 1, 2 in the (x1, x2)
space are given by the following:
R1(x2) = {1− x2} ∀x2 ∈ [0, 1] and R2(x1) =

{0} x1 ∈ [0,
1
2 )
{0, 1} x1 =
1
2
{1} x2 ∈ (
1
2 , 0].
It is easy to see that R , R1 ×R2 has no fixed point whereby this game has no equilibrium. Finally, note that
this is game is a potential game and it admits a potential function in the (x, y) space given by:
pi(x, y) = ϕ1(x1, y1) + ϕ2(x2, y2) =
1
2x1 + y1 −
1
2x2 − y2.
Consider the following modification of this example. Leader 1 has an additional constraint, ‘y2 = max{0, 1−
x1− x2}’, which in the original problem appeared in leader 2’s optimization problem. Likewise, leader 2 now has
an additional constraint ‘y1 = max{0, 1− x1− x2}’, which in the original problem, was in leader 1’s optimization
problem. More specifically,
• both leaders are constrained by both equilibrium constraints ;
• Leader i’s problem is parametrized the decisions of rival leaders (denoted by x−i) and the other leader’s
conjectures about the follower equilibrium (denoted by y−i).
L1(x2, y2) minimize
x1,y1
ϕ1(x1, y1) =
1
2x1 + y1
subject to
x1 ∈ [0, 1]
y1 = max{0, 1− x1 − x2}
y2 = max{0, 1− x1 − x2}
L2(x1, y1) minimize
x2,y2
ϕ2(x2, y2) = −
1
2x2 − y2
subject to
x2 ∈ [0, 1]
y1 = max{0, 1− x1 − x2}
y2 = max{0, 1− x1 − x2}
We claim that ((x1, x2), (y1, y2)) = ((0, 1), (0, 0)) is an equilibrium of this modified game. To see why this is
true, observe that Leader 1 gets ϕ1(0, 0) = 0 whereas leader 2 gets ϕ2(1, 0) = −
1
2 . Leader 1’s global minimum
is 0 and he thus has no incentive to deviate from this strategy. Leader 2’s strategy set at equilibrium reduces
to a singleton containing only his equilibrium strategy. This is induced by the presence of leader 1’s equilibrium
constraint in his optimization problem (the constraint y1 = max{0, 1 − x1, x2} is, at equilibrium, equivalent to
0 = max{0, 1− x2}; together with the constraint x2 ∈ [0, 1] this implies x2 = 1 and y2 = 0.) 
In the following section we generalize the approach adopted in this example. The modified game has shared
constraints even while the original does not. We show (Theorem 3.2) that a potential game with shared constraints
admits an equilibrium under mild conditions. Indeed global minimizers of the potential function over the shared
constraint are equilibria of this game. In this game, the shared constraint is given by the set
Fae =
{
(x1, x2, y1, y2)
∣∣∣∣∣(x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]2, (y1, y2) ≥ 0, y1 = max{0, 1− x1 − x2}y2 = max{0, 1− x1 − x2}
}
.
We will explain the notation Fae in the following sections. The global minimizer of pi over Fae is
arg min
(x,y)∈Fae
1
2x1 + y1 −
1
2x2 − y2 = ((0, 1), (0, 0)),
which is indeed the equilibrium.
7
3.2 Modification: Leaders sharing all equilibrium constraints
Consider the formulation in which the ith leader solves the following optimization problem.
Laei (x
−i, y−i) minimize
xi,yi
ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i)
subject to
xi ∈ Xi,
yi ∈ Yi,
yj ∈ S(x), j = 1, . . . , N.
We denote this game by E ae and note that the difference between E ae and E is that all constraints yj ∈ S(x),
j = 1, . . . , N are now a part of each leader’s optimization problem. In effect, each leader takes into account the
conjectures regarding the follower equilibrium made by all other leaders. The result is that for any i, yi satisfies
the same constraints in problems Li and L
ae
i , but xi is constrained by additional constraints in L
ae
i .
For yj ∈ Yj , xj ∈ Xj for j 6= i, let Ωaei (x
−i, y−i) be the feasible region of Laei (x
−i, y−i) and let Ωae,Fae,SN
and G be defined as
Ωae(x, y) ,
N∏
i=1
Ωaei (x
−i, y−i), Fae , {(x, y) | (x, y) ∈ Ωae(x, y)}, (11)
SN (x) ,
N∏
i=1
S(x), G , {(x, y) |y ∈ SN (x)}, (12)
where G is the graph of SN and Fae is the set of fixed points of Ωae. An equilibrium of E ae is a point
(x, y) ∈ Fae, such that ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i) ≤ ϕi(x¯i, y¯i;x
−i) ∀ (x¯i, y¯i) ∈ Ω
ae
i (x
−i, y−i), ∀i.
Proposition 3.1 Consider the multi-leader multi-follower game defined by E ae. Then the following hold:
(i) The mapping Ωae(x, y) is a shared constraint mapping satisfying (7);
(ii) A point (x, y) is a fixed point of Ωae if and only if it is a fixed point of Ω. i.e., F = Fae;
(iii) Every equilibrium of E is an equilibrium of E ae.
(iv) Fae is a closed set.
Proof :
(i) It can be seen that for any i and any x−i, y−i, where xj ∈ Xj , yj ∈ Yj for all j 6= i, we have that
Ωaei (x
−i, y−i) = {xi, yi | xi ∈ Xi, yi ∈ Yi, yj ∈ S(x) for j = 1, . . . , N}
= {xi, yi | xi ∈ Xi, yi ∈ Yi, y ∈ S
N (x)}.
But yj ∈ Yj , xj ∈ Xj for j 6= i, implying that
{xi, yi | xi ∈ Xi, yi ∈ Yi, y ∈ S
N (x)} = {xi, yi | xi ∈ Xi, yj ∈ Yj for j = 1, . . . , N, y ∈ S
N (x)}
= {xi, yi | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, (x, y) ∈ G},
where G is defined in (12). Thus Ωae is a shared constraint of the form dictated by (7).
(ii) It suffices to show that F = Fae. But, from (i) it follows that Fae = (X × Y )∩G. It is easy to see from the
definition of F that F = (X × Y ) ∩ G. The result follows.
(iii) An equilibrium (x, y) of E lies in F and thereby in Fae. Since Ωaei (x
−i, y−i) ⊆ Ωi(x−i, y−i), the result
follows.
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(iv) The relation y ∈ SN (x) is equivalent to the set of equations
Fnat(yi;x) = 0, ∀i ∈ N
where Fnat(·;x) is the natural map [9] of VI(G(x, ·),K(x)). Since K,G have been assumed continuous (cf.
immediately following (1)), it follows that the zeros of Fnat form a closed set.
A special case of the conventional game E which is already a shared-constraint game is the case (denoted by
E
bl) where leaders have disjoint set of followers. Effectively, each leader solves bilevel optimization problems as
follows.
Lbli (x
−i) minimize
xi,yi
ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i)
subject to
xi ∈ Xi,
yi ∈ Ŝi(xi),
yi ∈ Yi.
Since yi ∈ Ŝi(xi), there is no coupling of leader decisions in the constraints of leader problems. This is a special
case of E with S(x) ≡
∏
i∈N Ŝi(xi), where Ŝi(xi) is the solution of a variational inequality for each i and where
the objective of leader i depends only on the equilibrium of Ŝi(xi) and not on Ŝj(xj) for j 6= i. With a slight
abuse of our notation so far, we let yi denote an element of the set Ŝi(xi) and Yi be the space of such yi. Let Ω
bl
i
be the feasible region of Lbli (x
−i, y−i) and let Fbl be the set of fixed points of Ωbl ,
∏N
i=1Ω
bl
i . Since there is no
coupling, it is easily seen that
Fbl = Ωbl = {(x, y) | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y˜ , (x, y) ∈ Ĝ},
where Ĝ =
∏N
i=1 Ĝi, Y˜ ,
∏N
i=1 Yi, and Ĝi is the graph of Ŝi. If (xj , yj) ∈ Ω
bl
j , for j 6= i,
Ωbli = {(xi, yi) | xi ∈ Xi, yi ∈ Yi, yi ∈ Ŝi(xi)} = {(xi, yi) | (x, y) ∈ F
bl}.
It follows that this game is a shared constraint game.
3.3 Existence of global equilibria
We now present existence results for the games E ae, but since the only property we use is the shared constraint
structure, our results apply also to E bl. We emphasize that in our modified formulation E ae, the optimization
problem of each leader is indeed constrained by an equilibrium constraint – and it is thus a hard nonconvex
problem in its own right.
Our main result relates the global minimizers of the following optimization problem to the equilibria of E ae.
Pae minimize
x,y
pi(x, y)
subject to (x, y) ∈ Fae.
Theorem 3.2 (Minimizers of Pae and Equilibria of E ae) Let E ae be a potential multi-leader multi-follower
game with a potential function pi. Then any global minimizer of pi over Fae is an equilibrium of E ae.
Proof : Let (x, y) ∈ Fae be a global minimum of pi over Fae. Then, for each i ∈ N
pi(xi, yi, x
−i, y−i)− pi(ui, vi, x
−i, y−i) ≤ 0 ∀ (ui, vi) : (ui, vi, x
−i, y−i) ∈ Fae.
But, (ui, vi, x
−i, y−i) ∈ Fae if and only if (ui, vi) ∈ Ω
ae
i (x
−i, y−i), since Ωae is a shared constraint. Using this,
together with the fact that pi is a potential function, we obtain that for each i
ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i, y−i)− ϕi(ui, vi;x
−i, y−i) ≤ 0 ∀ (ui, vi) ∈ Ω
ae
i (x
−i, y−i).
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This implies that for i = 1, . . . , N , given (x−i, y−i), the vector (xi, yi) lies in the set of best responses for leader
i. In other words, (x, y) is an equilibrium of E ae.
It now follows that if the minimizer of Pae exists, the game E ae admits an equilibrium.
Theorem 3.3 (Existence of equilibria of E ae) Let E ae be a potential multi-leader multi-follower game with
a potential function pi. Suppose Fae is a nonempty set and ϕi(x) is a continuous function for i = 1, . . . , N . If
the minimizer of Pae exists (for example, if either pi is a coercive function on Fae or if Fae is compact), then E ae
admits an equilibrium.
Proof : It is easy to see from (8) that pi is continuous. By the hypothesis of the theorem, pi achieves its global
minimum on Fae. This could, for instance, be deduced from the coercivity of pi over a nonempty set Fae or by
the compactness of Fae Based on Theorem 3.2, a global minimizer of pi is an equilibrium of E ae and the result
follows.
Remark: Recall that Fae = F . Therefore Pae is essentially a minimization of pi over F . Furthermore, since the
closedness of F is already established, compactness follows from the boundedness of X × Y. 
If the objectives of the leaders are independent of the strategies of other leaders, the sum of the objectives is
a potential function, whereby any such game is a potential game. We thus have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4 Consider a multi-leader multi-follower game E ae for which Fae is nonempty and ϕi, i ∈ N are
continuous. Assume further that for each i ∈ N , ϕi(xi, yi;x−i) ≡ ϕi(xi, yi), i.e., assume that ϕi is independent
of x−i. If, either the functions ϕi, i ∈ N are coercive or if Fae is compact, the game E ae has an equilibrium.
Proof : If ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i) ≡ ϕi(xi, yi) for each i, pi =
∑
i∈N ϕi is a potential function. Then by Theorem 3.2, the
game has an equilibrium.
3.4 Existence of Nash stationary equilibria
Since Fae = F is characterized by equilibrium constraints, Pae is an MPEC. In this section, we relate stationary
points and local minimizers Pae to their equilibrium counterparts in the context of E ae. These relations assume
relevance because, being an MPEC, the global minimization of pi over Fae is hindered by the nonconvexity of
Fae as well as the possible nonconvexity of pi. When solved computationally, standard nonlinear programming
solvers may only produce a suitably defined stationary point of Pae. Traditionally, while a range of stationarity
points are considered in the context of mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints [30], we focus on the
notions Bouligand stationarity, local minima, strong stationarity and second-order strong stationarity. The proofs
of these results are quite similar to those from our recent submission [20]; we therefore provide only a sketch of
each proof.
3.4.1 B-stationary equilibria
Definition 3.1 (Nash B-stationary point) A point (x, y) ∈ Fae is a Nash B-stationary point of E ae if for all
i ∈ N ,
∇iϕi(x, y)
⊤d ≥ 0 ∀d ∈ T ((xi, yi); Ω
ae
i (x
−i)),
where T (z;K), the tangent cone at z ∈ K ⊆ Rn, is defined as follows:
T (z;K) ,
{
dz ∈ Rn : ∃{τk}, {zk} such that dz = lim
k→∞
(
zk − z
τk
)
,K ∋ zk → z, 0 < τk → 0
}
.
Proposition 3.5 (B-Stationary points of Pae and Nash B-stationary points of E ae) Let E ae be a poten-
tial multi-leader multi-follower game with potential function pi and suppose {ϕi}i∈N are continuously differentiable
functions over X × Y . If (x, y) is a B-stationary point of Pae, then (x, y) is a Nash B-stationary point of E ae.
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Proof : A stationary point (x, y) of pi over Fae satisfies
∇xpi(x, y)
⊤dx+∇ypi(x, y)
⊤dy ≥ 0, ∀(dx, dy) ∈ T ((x, y);Fae). (13)
Fix some i ∈ N and consider an arbitrary (dx′i, dy
′
i) ∈ T (xi, yi; Ω
ae
i (x
−i, y−i)). Let (ui,k, vi,k) ∈ Ω
ae(x−i, y−i),
(ui,k, vi,k)
k
→ (xi, yi) and 0 < τk
k
→ 0 such that ui,k−xiτk
k
→ dx′i and
vi,k−yi
τk
k
→ dy′i. It follows that the sequence
(xi,k,yi,k) ∈ F
ae, where
xi,k = (x1, . . . , ui,k, . . . , xN ), and yi,k = (y1, . . . , vi,k, . . . , yN ). (14)
Therefore, the direction (dxi,dyi) ∈ T (z;F
ae) where
dxi = (0, . . . , dx
′
i, . . . , 0) and dyi = (0, . . . , dy
′
i, . . . , 0).
Taking (dx, dy) = (dxi,dyi) in (13) and using (9) we get the required result.
Proposition 3.6 (Local minimum of Pae and local Nash equilibrium) Consider the multi-leader multi-
follower game E ae with potential function pi. If (x, y) is a local minimum of Pae, then (x, y) is a local Nash
equilibrium of E ae.
Proof : The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 3.2. If (x, y) is a local minimum of Pae, there exists a
neighborhood of (x, y), denoted by B(x, y), such that
pi(x, y) ≤ pi(x′, y′), ∀ (x′, y′) ∈ B(x, y) ∩ Fae. (15)
Consider an arbitrary i ∈ N and let Bi(xi, yi;x−i, y−i) :=
{
(ui, vi) |(ui, vi, x−i, y−i) ∈ B(x, y)
}
. Then it follows
that
(ui, vi) ∈
(
Ωaei (x
−i, y−i) ∩ Bi(xi, yi;x
−i, y−i)
)
⇐⇒ (ui, vi, x
−i, y−i) ∈ (Fae ∩ B(x, y)) .
Thus, using this relation in (15) and employing (8), we get
ϕi(x, y) ≤ ϕi(ui, vi, x
−i, y−i), ∀ (ui, vi) ∈
(
Ωaei (x
−i, y−i) ∩ Bi(xi, yi;x
−i, y−i)
)
.
In other words, (xi, yi) is a local minimizer of L
ae
i (x
−i, y−i). This holds for each i ∈ N , whereby (x, y) is a local
Nash equilibrium.
3.4.2 Strong stationarity
Here we relate other notions of stationarity for Pae with weaker equilibrium notions of E ae. When the algebraic
form of the constraints are available, a strong-stationary point can be defined. Let Xi = {xi|ci(xi) ≥ 0}, Yi =
{yi|di(yi) ≥ 0}, where ci, di are continuously differentiable. Let S(x) be the solution of a complementarity
problem: yi ∈ S(x) ⇐⇒ 0 ≤ yi ⊥ G(yi;x) ≥ 0, and G is Rp-valued and continuously differentiable. Thus Pae
can be written as
Pae minimize
x,y
pi(x, y)
subject to

ci(xi) ≥ 0
di(yi) ≥ 0
0 ≤ yi ⊥ G(yi, x) ≥ 0
 i = 1, . . . , N.
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To define the stationarity conditions, we define the relaxed nonlinear program below which requires specifying
the index sets I˜1i and I˜2i for i = 1, . . . , N where I˜1i, I˜2i ⊆ {1, . . . , p} and I˜1i ∪ I˜2i = {1, . . . , p}.
Paernlp minimizex,y
pi(x, y)
subject to

ci(xi) ≥ 0
di(yi) ≥ 0
[yi]j = 0, ∀j ∈ I˜
⊥
2i
[G(yi, x)]j = 0, ∀j ∈ I˜
⊥
1i
[yi]j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I˜1i
[G(yi, x)]j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I˜2i

i = 1, . . . , N,
where [·]j denotes the jth component of ‘·’ and I˜⊥1i, I˜
⊥
2i denote the complements of I˜1i, I˜2i respectively. Further,
we refer to the both index sets collectively as I˜i and the collection of index sets {I˜1, . . . , I˜N} by I˜. Note that
in accordance with [12], we define the index sets independent of the point (x, y). We may now state the strong
stationarity conditions at a particular point (x, y).
Definition 3.2 (Strong-stationarity point of Pae) A point (x, y) ∈ Fae is a strong stationarity point of Pae
if there exist Lagrange multipliers ηi, µi, λi and βi, i ∈ N such that the following conditions hold:
∇xipi(x, y) −∇xici(xi)
⊤ηi −
N∑
k=1
∇xiG(yk, x)
⊤βk = 0
∇yipi(x, y) −∇yidi(yi)
⊤µi − λi −∇yiG(yi, x)
⊤βi = 0
0 ≤ ηi ⊥ ci(xi) ≥ 0
0 ≤ µi ⊥ d(yi) ≥ 0
yi ≥ 0,
[λi]j [yi]j = 0, ∀j
G(yi, x) ≥ 0,
[βi]j [G(yi, x)]j = 0, ∀j
[yi]j = 0 or [G(yi, x)]j= 0, ∀j
if [G(yi, x)]j = 0 and [yi]j = 0, then [λi]j , [βi]j ≥ 0, ∀j

, ∀i ∈ N . (16)
Having defined the strong stationarity conditions, we are now in a position to define the second-order sufficiency
conditions. These assume relevance in defining a local Nash equilibrium; loosely speaking, at a local Nash
equilibrium, every agent’s decision satisfies themathematical programs with equilibrium constraints-second-order
sufficiency or the MPEC-SOSC conditions, given the decisions of its competitors. Furthermore, corresponding to
a stationary point of Paernlp, we may prescribe an active set A˜(x, y) such that A˜(x, y) , {A˜1(x, y), . . . , A˜N (x, y)},
where A˜i(x, y) denotes the set of active constraints corresponding to the set of constraints
ci(xi) ≥ 0
di(yi) ≥ 0
[yi]j = 0, ∀j ∈ I˜
⊥
2i
[G(yi, x)]j = 0, ∀j ∈ I˜
⊥
1i
[yi]j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I˜1i
[G(yi, x)]j ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ I˜2i

.
Suppose A˜i(x, y) = {A˜
c
i (x, y), A˜
d
i (x, y), A˜
e
i (x, y)}, where A˜
c
i , A˜
d
i and A˜
e
i denote the active sets associated with
ci(xi) ≥ 0, di(yi) ≥ 0, and the remaining constraints, respectively. The specification of the active set allows us to
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define the critical cone S∗(x, y) as
S∗(x, y) ,
{
s : s 6= 0,∇pi(x, y)⊤s = 0, a⊤j s = 0, j ∈ A˜(x, y), a
⊤
j s ≥ 0, j 6∈ A˜(x, y)
}
, (17)
where aj denotes the constraint gradients of the j
th constraint.
Definition 3.3 (Second-order Strong-stationarity point of Pae) A point (x, y) of the optimization problem
Pae is a second-order strong stationary point of Pae if it is a strong stationary point with Lagrange multipliers
(η, µ, λ, β) and sT∇2x,yL s > 0 for s ∈ S
∗(x, y), where S∗(x, y) is given by (17) and ∇2x,yL denotes the Hessian
of the Lagrangian of Paernlp with respect (x, y) evaluated at (x, y, η, µ, λ, β).
Next, we provide a formal definition of Nash strong-stationary and Nash second-order strong-stationary points
of E ae, which requires defining the critical cone S∗i (x, y) for each leader i = 1, . . . , N :
S∗i (x, y) ,
{
si : si 6= 0,∇iϕi(x, y)
⊤si = 0, a
⊤
j si = 0, j ∈ Ai(x, y), a
⊤
j si ≥ 0, j 6∈ Ai(x, y)
}
, (18)
whereAi(x, y)2 denotes the active set utilized in defining the relaxed nonlinear program associated with Laei (x
−i, y−i)
and aj denotes the constraint gradient associated with j
th constraint.
Definition 3.4 (Nash strong-stationary and Nash second-order strong-stationary points) A point (x, y) ∈
Fae is a Nash strong-stationary point of E ae if for i = 1, . . . , N , there exist Lagrange multipliers η¯i, µ¯i, λ¯i and
β¯ki , k = 1, . . . , N , such that the following conditions hold:
∇xiϕi(x, y)−∇xici(xi)
⊤η¯i −
N∑
k=1
∇xiG(yk, x)
⊤β¯ki = 0
∇yiϕi(x, y)−∇yidi(yi)
⊤µ¯i − λ¯i −∇yiG(yi, x)
⊤β¯ii = 0
0 ≤ η¯i ⊥ ci(xi) ≥ 0
0 ≤ µ¯i ⊥ d(yi) ≥ 0
yi ≥ 0,
[λ¯i]j[yi]j = 0, ∀j
G(yi, x) ≥ 0,
[β¯ki ]j [G(yi, x)]j = 0, ∀k ∈ N , ∀j
[yi]j = 0 or [G(yi, x)]j= 0, ∀j
if [G(yi, x)]j = 0 and [yi]j = 0, then [λ¯i]j , [β¯
k
i ]j ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ N , ∀j

, ∀i ∈ N . (19)
Furthermore, (x, y) is a Nash second-order strong stationary point of E ae if (x, y) is a Nash strong station-
ary point of E ae and if for i = 1, . . . , N , sTi ∇
2
xi,yiLi(x, y)si > 0 for si ∈ S
∗
i (x, y) where S
∗
i (x, y) is given by
(18), where ∇2xi,yiLi denotes the Hessian of the Lagrangian function of L
ae
i (x
−i, y−i) with respect to (xi, yi)
evaluated at (xi, yi, η¯i, µ¯i, λ¯i, β¯
1
i , . . . , β¯
N
i ) if E
ae = E ae or at (xi, yi, η¯i, µ¯i, λ¯i, β¯i) if E
ae ∈ {E ind, E bl} or at
(xi, yi, η¯i, µ¯i, λ¯i, γ¯i, β¯i) if E
ae = E cc.
Having defined the relevant objects, we now show that a strong-stationary point of Pae is a Nash strong-
stationary point of E ae and a second-order strong-stationary point of Pae is a second-order strong-stationary
point of E ae. For i = 1, . . . , N , one may define a corresponding relaxed NLP associated with the ith leader’s
problem, namely Laei (x
−i, y−i), by employing the index sets Ii. These index sets are defined using I˜ and are
given by3 Ii = {I˜1, . . . , I˜N}.
2The active set associated with Pae
rnlp
is denoted by A˜ while the active set associated with leader i’s problems is denoted by A˜i.
3The index sets associated with Pae
rnlp
are denoted by I˜ while the index sets employed for specifying leader i’s relaxed NLP are
denoted by Ii. Note that the cardinality of I˜i and Ii differs when considering the relaxed NLPs corresponding to E ae since every
leader level problem contains equilibrium constraints of all the leaders.
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Proposition 3.7 [Strong stationary points of Pae and Nash strong stationary points of E ae] Consider the multi-
leader multi-follower game with shared constraints E ae. Suppose (x, y) is a strong-stationary point of Pae and sat-
isfies (16) with Lagrange multipliers (ηi, µi, λi, βi)
N
i=1. Then (x, y) is a Nash strong-stationary point of E
ae and for
i = 1, . . . , N , (x, y) satisfies (19) with Lagrange multipliers defined as
(
η¯i, µ¯i, λ¯i, (β¯
k
i )
N
k=1
)
=
(
ηi, µi, λi, (βk)
N
k=1
)
Furthermore, if (x, y) is a second-order strong stationary point of Pae with multipliers (ηi, µi, λi, βi)
N
i=1, then (x, y)
is a Nash second-order strong stationary point of E ae with firm i’s multipliers given by
(
η¯i, µ¯i, λ¯i, (β¯
k
i )
N
k=1
)
.
Proof : Suppose (x, y) is a strong stationary point Pae, i.e., suppose there exist multipliers η, µ, λ and β such
that for (x, y), system (16) holds. For each kind of E ae, we show that (x, y) is a Nash strong stationary point of
E
ae. One may then construct Lagrange multipliers to satisfy (19). By comparison of (16) and (19), we see that
(19) admits a solution (x, y) with multipliers η¯i = ηi, µ¯i = µi, λ¯i = λi and β¯
k
i = βk for all i, k.
Now assume that (x, y) is a second-order strong stationary point of Pae. To show that (x, y) is a Nash second-
order strong stationary point of E ae, we construct Lagrange multipliers as above. It is easy to see, that by construc-
tion, ∇xi,yiL = ∇xi,yiLi and∇
2
xi,yiLi = ∇
2
xi,yiL for all i ∈ N , where Li is the Lagrangian of L
ae
i evaluated at (x, y)
and the above constructed Lagrange multipliers. Furthermore, by comparing the feasible region of Laei with F
ae,
we observe that the active sets of Laei can be defined as Ai(x, y) =
{
A˜ci (x, y), A˜
d
i (x, y), A˜
e
1(x, y), . . . , A˜
e
N (x, y)
}
.
Given the specification of the active set, we may now define a relaxed NLP corresponding to this active set
as well as define the corresponding critical cone S∗i (x, y). To prove the claim, we proceed by contradiction. If
(x, y) is not a Nash second-order strong stationary point, then for some i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, the point (xi, yi) does not
satisfy second-order strong stationary conditions, given (x−i, y−i). Then there exists a wi such that wi ∈ S
∗
i (x, y)
such that w⊤i ∇
2
xi,yiL
∗
iwi ≤ 0. We may now define w such that
w , (w1, . . . , wN ),
where wj = 0, j 6= i. Since wi ∈ S∗i (x, y), it follows that
0 = w⊤i ∇xi,yiϕi(x, y) = w
⊤
i ∇xi,yipi(x, y).
By definition of w, it follows that w⊤∇x,ypi(x, y) = 0. From the definition of w and by noting the constructions
of Ai(x, y), it can be seen that w ∈ S∗(x, y). As a consequence, we have that
0 ≥ wTi ∇
2
xi,yiLiwi = w
T∇2xi,yiL w.
But this contradicts the hypothesis that (x, y) is a second-order strong stationary point of Pae and the result
follows.
Notice that the form of equilibrium constraints was only used when considering stationarity concepts. The
global equilibrium results did not use the explicit form of the equilibrium constraints and as such are applicable
even for extensive form games.
As a final note, we recall it is not entirely necessary to employ the algebraic characterization of the constraints
in articulating strong stationarity (cf. [11, 13]). For instance, the authors examine the optimality conditions of a
disjunctive program defined as
min
x
f(x)
subject to x ∈ Λ ,
m⋃
i=1
Λi,
(20)
where Λi is a convex polyhedron for i = 1, . . . ,m. Such a problem captures most MPEC models considered in the
research literature. The authors proceed to show that if the generalized Guignard constraint qualification and a
suitably defined intersection property holds at a local minimizer z, then z is a strong stationary point. Note that
the definition of strong stationarity relies on using the Frec´het normal cone associated with Λi rather than the
algebraic characterization of the sets.
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3.5 Existence of global equilibria via fixed-point arguments
The reaction map of the multi-leader multi-follower game E does not have the properties required for applying
fixed point theorems. However, the modified formulation E ae, because of its shared constraint structure, allows
for the construction of a modified reaction map whose fixed points are equilibria of E ae and has properties that
are more favorable for the application of fixed point theory. This leads to an existence result for E ae that uses
fixed point theory and does not assume the existence of a potential function. We touch upon this topic in this
section.
To define the modified reaction map let Ψ : (X × Y )× (X × Y )→ R be given by
Ψ(x, y, x¯, y¯) ,
N∑
i=1
ϕi(x¯i, y¯i;x
−i) ∀(x, y), (x¯, y¯) ∈ X × Y. (21)
and consider the modified reaction map Υae : X × Y → 2F
ae
, defined as
Υae(x, y) ,
{
(x¯, y¯) ∈ Fae | Ψ(x, y, x¯, y¯) = inf
(u,v)∈Fae
Ψ(x, y, u, v)
}
. (22)
We show below that a fixed point of Υae is an equilibrium of E ae. The map Υae is analogous to that used by
Rosen [29, Theorem 1].
Theorem 3.8 (Fixed points of Υae and equilibria of E ae) Consider the game multi-leader multi-follower game
E
ae with a feasible region mapping Ωae. If Υae admits a fixed point, the game E ae admits an equilibrium.
Proof : Assume that the claim is false, i.e., assume there exists an (x, y) ∈ Υae(x, y) such that for some
(u, v) ∈ Ωae(x, y) and an index i ∈ {1, . . . , N} we have
ϕi(ui, vi;x
−i) < ϕi(xi, yi;x
−i).
Since (u, v) ∈ Ωae(x, y), and since Ωae satisfies (7), we must have (ui, x−i, vi, y−i) ∈ F . But this means
Ψ(x, y, (ui, x
−i), (vi, y
−i)) < Ψ(x, y, x, y),
a contradiction to (x, y) ∈ Υae(x, y).
We further have that Υae is upper semicontinuous under mild conditions.
Lemma 3.1 Let Ψ be continuous on X×Y and assume that X×Y is compact. Then Υae is upper semicontinuous.
If Υae is single-valued, then it is continuous (as a single-valued function).
Proof : By compactness of X × Y the infimum in the definition of Υae is achieved. Upper semi-continuity of
Υae follows from classical stability results (see e.g., Hogan [15]). The last claim follows as a special case of upper
semicontinuity of set-valued maps for single-valued maps.
By using the Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed point theorem [5], we obtain an existence result.
Theorem 3.9 Consider the multi-leader multi-follower game E ae where the objective functions ϕi, i ∈ N are
continuous. Suppose X × Y is nonempty, compact and convex. Suppose if Υae satisfies one of the following:
(i) Single-valued on X × Y ;
(ii) Multi-valued on X × Y with contractible images.
Then Υae admits a fixed point and E ae admits an equilibrium.
Proof : Υae may be taken to be a mapping from the compact convex set X × Y to subsets of X × Y . If Υae
is single-valued, Lemma 3.1 implies that it is continuous. Consequently, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem there
exists a fixed point of Υ. If Υae is multi-valued, then Lemma 3.1 shows that Υae is upper semicontinous. Then
since Υae is contractible-valued, by the Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed point theorem [5, Theorem 1], there exists a
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fixed point of Υae. In each of these cases, since there exists a fixed point of Υae, from Theorem 3.8, E ae admits
an equilibrium.
A natural question is when such conditions are useful. In general, convexity or contractibility of images of Υae
is not immediate; however, if there are specific settings where such claims can be made, then the aforementioned
results are powerful in that they do not require leader payoffs to admit potential functions. It is not true that
every equilibrium of the multi-leader multi-follower game with shared constraints is a fixed point of Υae; existence
of a fixed point to Υae is only a sufficient condition for such an equilibrium to exist. This can be checked easily
by considering a hypothetical case with convex Fae, wherein it is well known that fixed points of the reaction
map and the modified reaction map can be very different. In [18], Kulkarni and Shanbhag discuss these issues in
detail for convex shared-constraint games; in general, there exist equilibria that are not fixed points of Υae and
also games for which there are equilibria, but no fixed points to Υae.
Remark 3.1. (Relationship to variational equilibria in convex shared constraint games) When Fae
is convex, and ϕi(xi;x
−i) is convex in xi for all x
−i and all i, Lemma 3.8 and the map Υae also has an interesting
connection with the “variational equilibrium” [8, 10, 18] in games with convex shared constraints. In this setting,
these games are typically referred to as generalized Nash games and equilibria of such games are referred to
as generalized Nash equilibria (GNE). The variational equilibrium is defined as the solution of the variational
inequality VI(Fae, F ), where F = (∇1ϕ1, . . . ,∇NϕN ). By convexity, it can be easily seen that VI(Fae, F ) equals
the set of fixed points of Υae. The variational equilibrium is the generalized Nash equilibrium at which the
Lagrange multipliers, corresponding to the shared constraints, are identical across players. These multipliers can
be interpreted as the shadow prices of the associated constraints. Furthermore, when these prices are equal, the
equilibria can be viewed as corresponding to a uniform auction price while disparities in prices are a consequence
of discriminatory prices. The above observations form the basis of a detailed study of the VE and the GNE [18]
where we show that under general conditions, if a GNE exists, a VE also exists, in which case the VE is said to be
a refinement of the GNE [31, 3]. Furthermore, for potential games with potential function pi, F ≡ ∇pi, whereby
VI(Fae, F ) is equivalent to VI(Fae,∇pi). Thus in a potential game with shared constraints, every VE is also a
stationary point of the potential function over the shared constraint. Coming back to the game E ae, a stationary
point of Pae is therefore akin to a something like a VE of this formulation. 
Theorem 3.9 did not invoke the existence of a potential function. Nonetheless, there is a close relation between
the minimizer of the potential function, i.e. the solution of problem Pae, and the fixed points of Υae. We formalize
it through the following definition.
Definition 3.5 A stationary fixed point of Υae is a point (x, y) ∈ Fae with the property that (x, y) is satisfies
the stationarity conditions of the minimization of Ψ(x, y, u, v) over (u, v) ∈ F i.e.,
∇¯Ψ(x, y, x, y)⊤d ≥ 0 ∀ d ∈ T ((x, y);Fae),
where ∇¯Ψ(x, y, x, y) , ∂∂(u,v)Ψ(x, y, u, v)
∣∣∣
(u,v)=(x,y)
.
If E ae is a potential game with potential function pi, then we have ∇pi(x, y) ≡ ∇¯Ψ(x, y, x, y). Consequently, we
have the following relation.
Proposition 3.10 Let E ae be a potential game with potential function pi. (x, y) ∈ Fae is a stationary point of
the minimization pi over Fae if and only if (x, y) is a stationary fixed point of Υae.
4 Recovery of equilibria of E
The prior section has concentrated on the development of existence statements for the equilibria associated with
the shared-constraint (modified) equilibrium problem, denoted by E ae. While it has been shown that the equilibria
of E are indeed equilibria of E ae, it remains unclear as to how one may obtain the equilibria of E . In Section 4.1,
we consider settings where the Nash-stationary equilibria of E may indeed be recovered. A more refined statement
is provided in Section 4.2 under the assumption that follower equilibria are unique as a function of leader-level
decisions.
16
4.1 Obtaining Nash stationary points of E
In this section, we begin by providing an intuition about the relationship between the equilibria of the original
game and its shared constraint modification by considering a convex generalized Nash game. Consider a Nash
game in which player i has strategies xi, yi, objective fi(xi, yi;x
−i) and a nonlinear constraint h(x, yi) ≥ 0, where
for any x−i, h(xi, yi;x
−i) and fi(xi, yi;x
−i) are concave and convex in xi, yi, respectively. Specifically, player i
solves Ai(x
−i), defined next.
Ai(x
−i) minimize
xi,yi
fi(xi, yi;x
−i)
subject to h(x, yi) ≥ 0. (λ1)
We refer to this game as G and corresponds to E . Suppose Ai(x
−i) is a convex optimization problem for each
x−i. The shared constraint modification of this problem akin to the “ae” formulation is given by the following:
Aaei (x
−i, y−i) minimize
xi,yi
fi(xi, yi;x
−i)
subject to
h(x, y1) ≥ 0 (λ11)
...
h(x, yN ) ≥ 0. (λ1N )
Notice that since h(·, ·) is concave in xi, yi for all x−i, Aaei (x
−i, y−i) is a convex optimization problem. Denote
this game as Gae. Our first result relates equilibria of G to that of Gae:
Lemma 4.1 The point (x, y) is an equilibrium of G with multipliers λ1, . . . , λN if and only if (x, y) is an equi-
librium of Gae with
λii = λi and λij = 0, ∀j 6= i. (23)
Proof : By the same logic as in Prop, 3.1 (iii), any equilibrium of G is an equilibrium Gae. Since problems
Ai, i ∈ N , and Aaei , i ∈ N , are convex optimization problems, the aggregated KKT conditions of individual play-
ers are necessary and sufficient for (x, y) to be an equilibrium of G and Gae, respectively. (23) now follows from
a examination of the KKT conditions.
A more general statement is available in the context of E and E ae by examining the strong stationarity
conditions (the proof is straightforward; we skip it).
Proposition 4.1 (Strong stationary points of E ae and E ) Consider the multi-leader multi-follower games
E and E ae. Then the following hold:
1. (x, y) is a Nash strong-stationary point of E ae satisfying (19) with Lagrange multipliers
(
η¯i, µ¯i, λ¯i, (β¯
k
i )
N
k=1
)
and (β¯ik) = 0, ∀k 6= i, ∀i if and only if (x, y) is a Nash strong-stationary point of E with multipliers(
η¯i, µ¯i, λ¯i, β¯
i
i
)
.
2. Furthermore, (x, y) is a Nash second-order strong-stationary point of E ae with firm i’s multipliers given by(
η¯i, µ¯i, λ¯i, (β¯
k
i )
N
k=1
)
and (β¯ik) = 0, ∀k 6= i, ∀i if and only if (x, y) is a Nash second-order strong-stationary
point of E with multipliers
(
η¯i, µ¯i, λ¯i, β¯
i
i
)
.
In effect, one can inspect the multipliers of an equilibrium of the shared-constraint game to ascertain whether
indeed such a point is an equilibrium of the original equilibrium problem. Yet, much more can be drawn from
this observation. Through the shred-constraint modification, a generalized Nash game is converted to a shared-
constraint (generalized) Nash game. Furthermore, this modified game admits a set of generalized Nash equilibria
(GNE) that contain two important sets of equilibria (each of which may be empty):
Equilibria of E : These equilibria correspond to points characterized by multipliers that display a precise form
as specified by Prop. 3.7.
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Variational equilibria of E ae: These equilibria are defined by a common Lagrange multiplier across every
agent. Such equilibria have proved to be particularly relevant in the context of convex shared-constraint Nash
games where the common Lagrange multiplier is seen as the uniform auction price [18]. Moreover, in the context
of convex Nash games, VE may be obtained through the solution of a variational inequality problem [18, 19].
In the current context, under an assumption of potentiality on the leader-level problems, such equilibria may be
derived by the solution to a suitably defined optimization problem, such as Pae.
We believe that viewing the equilibria of E as particular equilibria of E ae allows for two important directions:
1. Pathways to existence statements: The shared constraint formulation admits a larger set of equilibria,
that includes equilibria of the conventional formulation (if they exist). We have seen that under mild
assumptions, existence of equilibrium akin to variational equilibria can be guaranteed. This may be a
stepping stone towards developing an approach for claiming existence of equilibria of E .
2. Tools for equilibrium computation and selection: Equilibrium computation is a crucial concern in the design
of markets, a realm where such problems routinely arise. Yet, such designs are plagued by a key challenge
in that equilibria are not readily computable. If the objectives admit a potential function, this formula-
tion provides two crucial benefits. First, it allows for computing global variational equilibria through the
solution of a single optimization problem. Second, if one takes the view that the conventional formulation
is the “correct” formulation, the modification may provide a means to arriving at an equilibrium of the
conventional formulation, provided it exists.
4.2 Recovery of equilibria when follower equilibria are unique
Assume that for every x ∈ X , S(x) is a singleton belonging to ∩i∈NYi in which case we have F = {(x, y) | x ∈
X, y = SN (x)} = Fae. Substituting the follower equilibrium tuple y in terms of x in the definition of Υae, we
define Γae : X → 2X , as follows:
Γae(x) , argmin
u∈X
Ψ(x,SN (x), u,SN (u)).
If x is a fixed point of Γae, then (x,SN (x)) an equilibrium of E ae. For simplicity of exposition we will refer to
fixed points of Γae as “equilibria” of E ae. Now consider the original formulation E and rewrite the leader problem
Li in the following form.
Li(x
−i) minimize
xi
ϕi(xi,S(x);x−i)
subject to xi ∈ Xi,
It is easy to see that an “equilibrium” of this game is the same as a fixed point of Γ : X → 2X , where
Γ(x) , arg min
u∈X
N∑
i=1
ϕi(ui,S(ui, x
−i);x−i) = arg min
u∈X
Ψ(x,SN (x), u,S(u1, x
−1), . . . ,S(uN , x
−N )).
This follows from noting that X is a Cartesian product of X1, . . . , XN . The next theorem exploits the similarity
between Γae and Γ to develop conditions under which the fixed points of Γae are also fixed points of Γ.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose for all x ∈ X, S(x) is a singleton lying in ∩i∈NYi and let the objectives of players be
such that
Ψ(x,SN (x), u,SN (u)) ≤ Ψ(x,SN (x), u,S(u1, x
−1), . . . ,S(uN , x
−N )), ∀ u, x ∈ X.
Then every fixed point of Γae is also a fixed point of Γ and thus an equilibrium of E . In particular, if Γae admits
a fixed point, the conventional formulation E admits an equilibrium.
Proof : If x is a fixed point of Γae,
Ψ(x,SN (x), x,SN (x)) ≤ Ψ(x,SN (x), u,SN (u)) ∀u ∈ X.
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By the hypothesis of the theorem, we have
Ψ(x,SN (x), x,SN (x)) ≤ Ψ(x,SN (x), u,S(u1, x
−1), . . . ,S(uN , x
−N )),
which means x is a fixed point of Γ.
Remark 4.2. Notice the difference between Γ and Γae. Importantly, observe that a fixed point of one is not
necessarily a fixed point of the other. This may come as a surprise, considering that Proposition 3.1 shows that
equilibria of E are also equilibria of E ae. But this “contradiction” can be explained by noticing that a fixed point
of Γ is an equilibrium of E ae, but such an equilibrium need not be a fixed point of Γae. Since the fixed point
formulation through Υae or Γae is only a sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria of E ae, there may exist
equilibria of these games that are not necessarily fixed points of the Γae. 
5 An example: a hierarchical Cournot game
In this section, we present a multi-leader multi-follower game from [33] which when formulated in the conventional
form has an equilibrium. Through this game, we will demonstrate the validity of Propositions 3.1 and Theorem
3.2.
Below, we modify this game in the form of E ae and show that the claim made in Proposition 3.1 holds:
the equilibrium of this game is also an equilibrium of its modification. The example shows that equilibrium
conditions of E ae have more variables than the conditions of E , and thus allow for more “degrees of freedom”
for their satisfaction. Cournot games, as noted in Section 2.2, admit potential functions. We then calculate the
minimizer of the potential function of this game (i.e., the solution of Pae) and show that it is an equilibrium of
the modified game, thereby verifying Theorem 3.2.
Example 5.2. Let E be a game with N identical leaders and n identical followers. The follower strategies
conjectured by leader i are denoted by {yfi }f=1,...,n (we use f to index followers) and we let y
−f
i denote
∑
j 6=f y
j
i .
Leader i solves the following parametrized problem:
Li(x
−i, y−i) minimize
xi,yi
1
2cx
2
i − xi
(
a− b(xi +
∑
j 6=i xj +
∑n
f=1 y
f
i )
)
subject to
yfi = SOL(F(y¯
−f
i , xi, x
−i)), ∀ f,
xi ≥ 0,
where yfi ∈ R is the conjecture of leader i of the equilibrium strategy of follower f . Follower f solves the problem
(F(y¯−f , x)):
F(y¯−f , x) minimize
yf
1
2c(y
f )2 − yf
(
a− b(yf +
∑
j 6=f y
j +
∑
i∈N xi)
)
subject to yf ≥ 0,
where constants a, b, c are positive real numbers. Since these constants are the same for all followers, equilibrium
strategies of all followers are equal. Consequently the follower equilibrium tuple conjectured by leader i is given
by yi = (ŷi, . . . , ŷi), where ŷi satisfies ŷi ∈ SOL(F((n − 1)ŷi, x)) (since y¯−f = (n − 1)ŷi). For any x, there is a
unique ŷi that satisfies this relation, given by
ŷi =
{
(a− b
∑
j xj)/(c+ b(n+ 1)) if 0 ≤
∑
j xj ≤ a/b,
0 if
∑
j xj > a/b.
(24)
By considering only the first of above cases in (24), we get a restricted game where leader i solves
L′i(x
−i, ŷ−i) minimize
xi,ŷi
1
2cx
2
i − xi
[
a− b
(
xi +
∑
j 6=i xj + nŷi
)]
subject to
ŷi =
a−b
∑
j
xj
c+b(n+1) , : λ¯i∑
j xj ≤ a/b, : µ¯i
xi ≥ 0.
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This is a generalized Nash game with coupled but not shared constraints. However, since the optimization
problems of the leaders are convex (this is not obvious; see [33, Lemma 1] for a proof), we may use the first-
order KKT conditions to derive an equilibrium. Let λ¯i be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding the constraint
“ŷi =
a−b
∑
j
xj
c+b(n+1) ”. The equilibrium conditions of this game are
0 ≤ xi ⊥ (c+ b)xi − a+ b
∑
j
xj + nŷi
+ b
c+ b(n+ 1)
λ¯i + µ¯i ≥ 0,
ŷi =
a− b
∑
j xj
c+ b(n+ 1)
,
0 ≤ µ¯i ⊥ a/b−
∑
j
xj ≥ 0,
0 = nbxi + λ¯i.

∀ i ∈ N . (25)
We can verify that the tuple x = x∗ where all leaders play the same strategy x̂, i.e. x∗i = x̂ for all i with x̂ given
by
x̂ =
a(b+ c)
b(b+ c)(N + 1) + c(b + c) + bcn
,
satisfies equilibrium conditions for the restricted game {L′i}i∈N . The optimal Lagrange multiplier is given by
λ¯∗i = −nbx
∗
i , µ¯
∗
i = 0. It can then be verified that this equilibrium also satisfies the requirement
∑
i x
∗
i < a/b,
whereby it is an equilibrium of the original game. The other case of ŷi = 0 does not result in an equilibrium that
satisfies
∑
i xi > a/b, and consequently x
∗ is the only equilibrium.
Verifying Proposition 3.1 (An equilibria of E is an equilibrium of E ae): Let us now consider this game
modified as E ae.
Laei (x
−i, y−i) minimize
xi,yi
1
2cx
2
i − xi(a− b(xi +
∑
j 6=i xj +
∑n
f=1 y
f
i ))
subject to
yfk = SOL(F(y¯
−f
k , xk, x
−k)), ∀ f, ∀ k = 1, . . . , N
xi ≥ 0.
Notice that the equilibrium constraint is now for all f and for all k. For any k, the equilibrium constraint may
be simplified using (24), giving an equation in ŷk. It is easy to check that this game also admits no equilibrium
with
∑
j xj > a/b. Thus, this game is equivalent to the game where
∑
j xj is constrained to be in [0, a/b]. For
such values of
∑
j xj , the first case of (24) applies, and it gives us a game where leader i solves
Laei (x
−i, ŷ−i) minimize
xi,yi
1
2cx
2
i − xi
[
a− b
(
xi +
∑
j 6=i xj + nŷi
)]
subject to
ŷk =
a−b
∑
j xj
c+b(n+1) , : λ
k
i , k = 1, . . . , N∑
j xj ≤ a/b, : µi,
xi ≥ 0.
This is a generalized Nash game with (convex) shared constraints and convex optimization problems for leaders.
Let λki be the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint “ŷk =
a−b
∑
j
xj
c+b(n+1) ” in the problem Li. The
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equilibrium conditions for the generalized Nash equilibrium (see [18]) of this game are
0 ≤ xi ⊥ (b+ c)xi − a+ b
∑
j
xj + nŷi
 + b
c+ b(n+ 1)
N∑
j=1
λji + µi ≥ 0,
ŷi =
a− b
∑
j xj
c+ b(n+ 1)
,
0 ≤ µi ⊥ a/b−
∑
j
xj ≥ 0,
0 = nbxi + λ
i
i,

∀ i ∈ N . (26)
Notice that the Lagrange multipliers λji for j 6= i are unconstrained barring their presence in the first condition
of (26). Comparing (26) and (25), we see that if λ¯∗, x∗ solve system (25), then x = x∗ and λji = λ¯
∗
i I{j=i} for all
i, j ∈ N gives a solution to system (26). Consequently, an equilibrium of the original game E is an equilibrium
of E ae. We have thereby verified Proposition 3.1 for this problem.
The presence of surplus Lagrange multipliers provides us with more variables than the number of equations,
whereby existence of solutions is easier to guarantee. An equilibrium of E is an equilibrium of the modified game
E
ae with a specific configuration of the vector of Lagrange multipliers. Consequently, if an equilibrium exists to
E
ae, there is no guarantee that there exists one to the original game E .
Verifying Theorem 3.2 (Global minimizer of pi is an equilibrium of E ae): Applying the same arguments
as before, we can effectively consider the strategies of leader i in game E ae as xi and ŷi. Further, suppose the
function pi is given by
pi(x, ŷ) = 12c
∑
i
x2i − a
∑
i
xi + b
∑
i
x2i +
∑
i<j
xixj
+ nb∑
i
xiŷi,
where ŷ , (ŷ1, . . . , ŷN ). Notice that the map F (cf., Lemma 2.1) is given by
F (x, ŷ) =
(
∂ϕi
∂xi
∂ϕi
∂ŷi
)
i∈N
=
(
(b+ c)xi − a+ b
(∑
j xj + nŷi
)
nbxi
)
i∈N
,
and that ∇pi ≡ F , whereby pi is a potential function for E ae. The set Fae for this game is
Fae = {(x, ŷ) | x ≥ 0, ŷi satisfies (24) ∀ i}.
We now determine the global minimizer of pi over Fae. A significant difficulty in characterizing the global
minimizer of pi is that pi is not necessarily convex (despite the convexity of the objectives of leaders in their own
variables).
We argue as follows. By membership of (x, ŷ) in Fae, we either have ŷi =
a−b
∑
j xj
c+b(n+1) for all i or we have ŷi = 0
for all i. Substituting for ŷ, we can write pi as a function only of x (with a slight abuse of notation)
pi(x) =

1
2c
∑
i x
2
i − a
∑
i xi + b
(∑
i x
2
i +
∑
i<j xixj
)
+ nb
a−b
∑
i
xi
c+b(n+1)
∑
i xi if 0 ≤
∑
i xi ≤ a/b,
1
2c
∑
i x
2
i − a
∑
i xi + b
(∑
i x
2
i +
∑
i<j xixj
)
if
∑
i xi > a/b.
By symmetry, the values xi that minimize pi are equal for all i. Let xi = x
′ for all i be the minimizer. Then,
pi(x′) =

1
2Ncx
′2 − aNx′ + b
(
Nx′2 + N(N−1)2 x
′2
)
+ nb a−bNx
′
c+b(n+1)Nx
′ if 0 ≤ x′ ≤ a/(Nb),
1
2Ncx
′2 − aNx′ + b
(
Nx′2 + N(N−1)2 x
′2
)
if x′ > a/(Nb).
The right hand derivative of pi at x′ = a/b is positive, ∇pi(x′)+|x′=a/b = N [
ac
Nb − a+ a(N + 1)] > 0. Furthermore
pi is increasing and coercive for x′ > a/(Nb), and consequently the minimizer of pi lies in [0, a/(Nb)]. Since x′
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is a global minimizer of pi, x′ necessarily satisfies the first-order KKT conditions for the minimization of pi over
[0, a/(Nb)]:
0 ≤ x′ ⊥ N
(
(b+ c)x′ − a+ bNx′ + nb
a− bNx′
c+ b(n+ 1)
−
nb2Nx′
c+ b(n+ 1)
)
+ µ′ ≥ 0, (27)
0 ≤ µ′ ⊥ a/(Nb)− x′ ≥ 0,
where µ′ is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint ‘a/(Nb) − x′ ≥ 0’. If x′, µ′ is a solution of system (27),
then xi = x
′, µi = µ
′ and λji = −nbxj = −nbx
′ for all i, j ∈ N , solves system (26) for the equilibrium of E ae.
Consequently x = (x′, . . . , x′) is an equilibrium of E ae. This verifies Theorem 3.2.
It should be emphasized that we have claimed that a solution to the concatenated first-order KKT conditions
of the minimization of pi over Fae is a global equilibrium of E ae, a claim that is valid because the leader problems
in E ae have been reduced to convex problems. In the case where S is single-valued (as it was in this example),
this is possible because we could argue that for values (x, y) of interest, the equation y = S(x) is linear in x, y. 
6 Conclusions
To summarize, while general existence results for the original formulation of multi-leader multi-follower games
(more generally EPECs) are rare, we observed that a modified formulation in which each player is constrained by
the equilibrium constraints of all players contains the equilibria of the original game when this game does indeed
admit equilibria. This modified game admits a shared constraint structure and when the leaders’ objectives
admit a potential function, the set of global minimizers of the potential function over the shared constraint
are the equilibria of the modified multi-leader multi-follower game. Similar statements were made relating the
stationary points of such a problem to the associated Nash B-stationary and strong-stationary equilibria. In
effect, the above results reduced the question of the existence of an equilibrium to that of the solvability of an
optimization problem, in particular a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. This solvability can
be claimed under fairly standard conditions that are tractable and verifiable – e.g., coercive objective over a
nonempty feasible region – and existence of a global equilibrium is seen to follow.
It was further seen that the equilibria of the original formulation can be viewed as equilibria of the shared-
constraint modification in which the associated Lagrange multipliers take on a specific form. This understanding
may have much potential in deriving existence statements as well as computational schemes for the equilibria
arising from the original formulation. We concluded with an application of our findings on a multi-leader multi-
follower symmetric Cournot game.
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